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Abstract. Rigorous analysis of demographic catastrophes shows that, individually, they 
were too weak to shape the growth of human population and of the associated economic 
growth. On average, only 6.5% of all major demographic catastrophes, associated with the 
death toll larger than or equal to one million, were potentially strong enough to cause 
perhaps a minor change in the growth trajectory of the world population, but as shown by 
the population data, they did not produce any noticeable disturbance. The absence of 
impacts of demographic catastrophes on the growth of population can be explained not only 
by their low relative intensity but also by the strong and efficient regenerating process 
recorded for the first time by Malthus. There was, however, one unusual event manifested 
in the convergence of five, major demographic catastrophes. They have caused a minor and 
short-lasting change in the growth trajectory of the world population, which, however, was 
soon counteracted by the process of regeneration. This analysis shows that the dominant 
force controlling the growth of human population was too strong to be influenced in any 
substantial way by accidental forces. As explained in an earlier publication, this strong and 
dominant force driving the growth of population was the force of procreation, which was 
approximately constant per person, the force expressed as a difference between the ever-
present, biologically-controlled, force of sex drive and the ever-present and also 
biologically-controlled process of aging and dying.  
Keywords: Demographic catastrophes, Growth of population, Economic growth, 
Malthusian stagnation, Hyperbolic growth, Mechanism of hyperbolic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
emographic catastrophes were supposed to have shaped the growth of 
human population and indirectly also the economic growth because as 
indicated by Maddison’s data (Maddison, 2001; 2006; 2010) these two 
processes are strongly correlated. Demographic catastrophes were supposed to 
have been responsible for creating the alleged, but non-existent, epoch of 
Malthusian stagnation in the growth of population and in the associated economic 
growth. This concept, which was accepted for decades in the demographic and 
economic research, has been recently reinforced by Galor and his associates by the 
deliberately distorted presentation of data (Ashraf, 2009; Galor, 2005a; 2005b; 
2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Galor & Moav, 
2002; Snowdon & Galor, 2008). We have discussed this issues in earlier 
publications and we have shown that precisely the same data, which were used in 
their distorted way by Galor and his associates to support their preconceived but 
erroneous ideas, are in fact in the direct contradiction of the concept of Malthusian 
stagnation (Nielsen, 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 
2016h).  
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The erroneous concept of Malthusian stagnation and takeoffs from the alleged 
but non-existent Malthusian trap in the demographic and economic growth is based 
on the incorrect interpretations of hyperbolic distributions. They are indeed slow 
over a long time and fast over a short time but they increase monotonically and 
there is no place on them where they change suddenly from being slow to being 
fast. In order to explain the mechanism of hyperbolic growth, hyperbolic 
distributions have to be treated as a whole. They cannot be divided into two or 
three different regimes of growth as incorrectly imagined by Galor (2005a; 2011) 
and by many other researchers. 
In the discussion presented here we shall extend our earlier discussions of the 
growth of human population by concentrating our attention on the possible impacts 
of demographic catastrophes. We have already explained (Nielsen, 2016i) that in 
harmony with the observation published by Malthus (1798), his positive checks 
(demographic catastrophes and harsh living conditions) have a dichotomous effect 
on the growth of population: they are destructive by increasing the death toll but 
they are also constructive by triggering the process of regeneration. In the 
discussion presented here we are going to demonstrate that there is also another 
reason why demographic catastrophes did not shape the growth of human 
population: they were generally too weak to have any tangible impact. They might 
have been strong enough to upset the growth of some local populations but with 
only one exception discussed earlier (Nielsen, 2016j) when there was an unusual 
convergence of five remarkably strong demographic catastrophes, they had no 
effect on the growth of global population, or even on the growth of regional 
populations (Nielsen, 2016d). 
 
2. The alleged age of pestilence and famine 
In one of his publications, Lagerlöf stated that ‚Throughout human history, 
epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the growth path of population‛ 
(Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 435). He studied the growth of population in England, France 
and Sweden using his model of growth, which incorporated the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation. Similar calculations were carried out earlier by Artzrouni & 
Komlos (1985) for the world population. These two studies are most interesting 
because when closely examined they show that the mechanism of stagnation does 
not produce expected results (Nielsen, 2016k). It did not produce a stagnant state of 
growth. Lagerlöf missed the opportunity of seeing it because he did not compare 
his model calculations with data. Artzrouni & Komlos (1985) produced a 
distribution for the growth of the world population but did not notice that their 
model generated exponential growth with no signs of stagnation. Furthermore, their 
results are contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2016k) because the world growth of 
population was never exponential (Nielsen, 2016d; 2016j). 
Lagerlöf carried out Monte-Carlo calculations, which were supposed to confirm 
the existence of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation in the growth of population 
allegedly caused by the effects of demographic catastrophes, such as epidemics, 
wars and famines. He incorporated explicitly the mechanism of stagnation in his 
model. Consequently, his model should have been expected to produce the process 
of stagnation but it did not. Before the publication of Lagerlöf’s paper, data for the 
United Kingdom, France and Sweden were already available (Maddison, 2001) but 
unfortunately Lagerlöf did not compare his model-generated calculations with 
these most essential data.  
These data are shown in Figure 1. Their analysis demonstrates that data for the 
UK and France follow hyperbolic trajectories. For Sweden, there was a change 
from a hyperbolic distribution to exponential growth. All these data and their 
analysis demonstrate that there was no stagnation in the growth of population and 
that contrary to the original assumption of Lagerlöf, ‚epidemics, wars and famines‛ 
did not shape ‚the growth path of population‛. The past growth may have been 
slow but it was not stagnant. It was slow because it was hyperbolic. It then became 
fast because it was hyperbolic. Only in Sweden it was diverted to a faster new 
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trajectory but it was not a transition from stagnation to growth but a transition from 
growth to growth, from a hyperbolic growth to an exponential growth. 
 
 
Figure 1. Population growth in the United Kingdom, France and Sweden. Data (Maddison, 
2001) are compared with hyperbolic distributions. Population growth was increasing 
monotonically. It was slow in the past because it was hyperbolic. For Sweden, there was a 
change from a slow hyperbolic growth to a faster exponential growth around AD 1600. 
There was no stagnation. The growth of population was not shaped by demographic 
catastrophes, as claimed by Lagerlöf (2003a). 
 
For France, the growth of population was following closely hyperbolic 
distribution at least until around 2000. For the United Kingdom, the growth was 
hyperbolic until around 1820, when it started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
According to the generally accepted interpretations of the mechanism of the growth 
of human population, we should expect a significant boosting (takeoff or 
explosion) around the time of the Industrial Revolution, 1760 and 1840, (Floud & 
McCloskey, 1994). This takeoff should be clearly indicated in the United 
Kingdom, the very centre of this revolution, where its impacts should have been 
most clearly demonstrated. The takeoff did not happen. On the contrary, in the 
direct contradiction of these usually claimed expectations, the growth of population 
in the UK started to be diverted to a slower trajectory at around 1820, right at the 
time when it was supposed to have been boosted. 
In Sweden, the growth of population was boosted but it was boosted at a wrong 
time, around AD 1600, i.e. well before the Industrial Revolution. The boosted 
growth follows an exponential trajectory, as indicated by the straight line in this 
semi logarithmic display. 
Hyperbolic distributions displayed in Figure 1 are described by the following 
simple equation: 
 
1
( )S t
a kt


,          (1) 
 
where ( )S t is the size of the population, t is time, while a and k are the parameters 
determined by fitting hyperbolic distributions to data. 
For the hyperbolic distributions displayed in Figure 1, parameters are: 
31.221 10a   and 76.511 10k   for the UK, 42.085 10a   and 89.635 10k   for 
France and 34.935 10a   and 62.221 10k   for Sweden. 
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Exponential distribution describing the growth of population in Sweden from 
AD 1600 is given by the following equation: 
 
( ) rtS t be ,          (2) 
 
with parameters 25.798 10b   and 35.973 10r   . From AD 1600, population in 
Sweden was increasing at an approximately constant rate of 0.6%. Just before the 
transition to this new trend, the growth rate for the preceding hyperbolic 
distribution was only 0.16%. The new exponential trajectory was approximately 
3.7 times faster than the preceding hyperbolic trajectory at the time of the 
transition.  
Hyperbolic growth is often described as ‚faster-than-exponential‛ or ‚hyper-
exponential‛. Such descriptions should be avoided. They are inaccurate and 
misleading. The concept of the faster-than-exponential growth was introduced, or 
at least strongly promoted, by Bartlett (1993). However, he has readily admitted 
that he was wrong: ‚Thanks for your thoughtful analysis of my writing about faster 
and slower than exponential. You are right!  My wording is unclear and confusing 
and wrong. I have used these terms for years and you are the first person to point 
out this error to me‛ (Bartlett, 2011). If only the erroneous concepts adopted in the 
economic and demographic research could be so readily corrected we would see 
progress in these two fields of study, rather than the existing and long-lasting 
stagnation. 
In the example presented in Figure 1, exponential growth in Sweden after 
around AD 1600, is faster than the preceding hyperbolic growth and thus, in this 
case, hyperbolic growth (the so-called ‚faster-than-exponential‛ growth) is in fact 
slower than exponential. 
We can only compare specific distributions and see which of them are faster or 
slower. Faster-than-exponential distributions do not exist because we can always 
design exponential growth, which over a certain time will be faster than some other 
incorrectly claimed faster-than-exponential growth. 
If we have to use the expression ‚faster-than-exponential‛ we have to be 
specific. We have to describe clearly, which specific distributions are being 
compared and over specifically what range of the independent variable. Thus, for 
instance, for the distributions shown in Figure 1 for Sweden we could say that over 
the range of the displayed time, the exponential growth, which commenced in 1600 
was faster than the preceding hyperbolic growth. However, we obviously cannot 
claim that the hyperbolic growth before 1600 was ‚faster-than-exponential‛ or 
‚hyper-exponential‛ because we have already demonstrated that in this particular 
case this so called ‚faster-then-exponential‛ or ‚hyper-exponential‛ growth was 
obviously slower than the exponential growth, which replaced this hyperbolic 
growth.  
Lagerlöf did not invent the concept of Malthusian stagnation, which is supposed 
to be caused by the lethal effects of demographic catastrophes. He just accepted it 
without any criticism maybe because going with the flow increases the chance of 
publishing new results. When in one of his papers, published also in 2003, Lagerlöf 
was associating the hypothetical epoch of Malthusian stagnation with ‚epidemic 
shocks‛ he was quickly corrected by a referee for missing the effects of wars: ‚As 
suggested by a referee, this process could possibly be interpreted in terms of wars, 
instead of epidemics‛ (Lagerlöf, 2003b, p. 766).  
Both, Lagerlöf and his referee were wrong. The process of Malthusian 
stagnation cannot be interpreted ‚in terms of wars, instead of epidemics‛ because 
as shown by data presented in Figure 1, Malthusian stagnation did not exist. 
However, neither Lagerlöf nor his referee cared to consult the relevant data. Data 
appear to be of lesser importance than the mantra of stagnation.  
Unfortunately, this mantra is repeated without any convincing justification in 
the economic and demographic research, and every effort is made to make sure that 
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it is repeated faithfully and as required. As mentioned earlier, Lagerlöf did not 
compare his model-calculations with data, but his referee was also misguided 
because the doctrine of Malthusian stagnation is repeatedly contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d; 2016j). 
According to the established knowledge in demography and in economic 
research, ‚The age of pestilence and famines lasted until 1875‛ (Rogers & 
Hackenberg, 1987, p. 234) when there was supposed to have been a transition from 
stagnation to a fast growth, the transition described usually as a takeoff or 
explosion. It is unclear how this precise date was determined but it might have 
been suggested by the generally accepted but erroneous notion of the alleged 
transition from stagnation to growth around the Industrial Revolution, 1760 
and1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). Analysis of data shows convincingly that 
there was no stagnation in the growth of population and in the economic growth, 
and that there was no transition, which could be described as a takeoff or 
explosion. What is interpreted as an explosion is just the natural continuation of 
hyperbolic growth (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d; 2016j). 
The mythical age of pestilence and famines was supposed to have been 
characterised by what is known as Malthusian oscillations. According to this 
doctrine ‚…periodic epidemics of plague, cholera, typhoid and other infectious 
diseases would in one or two years wipe out the gains made over decades. Over 
long periods of time there would, consequently, be almost no population growth at 
all‛ (van de Kaa, 2010, p. 87). ‚The pattern of growth [of human population] until 
about 1650 is cyclic‛ (Omran, 1971, Table 4, p. 533). Here we have a different date 
for the termination of the age of pestilence and famine, which is hardly surprising 
because these dates are based on impressions combined with a good dose of 
imagination. The age of pestilence and famine, with its assumed strong effects on 
the growth of population and on the economic growth, did not exist.  
The alleged, but non-existent, transition from stagnation to growth was 
supposed to have been associated with the transitions in the birth and death rates. It 
is interesting, however, that while Omran shows examples of the claimed 
transitions in birth and death rates, his examples (for Sweden, England, Japan, 
Ceylon and Chile) show clearly and convincingly that these transitions had 
absolutely no impact on the growth of population (Omran, 2005).  
Changes in birth and death rates are not necessarily reflected in changes in the 
growth of population. The growth of population is not determined by the birth and 
death rates alone but the average difference, i.e. by the average gap, between these 
two quantities. Birth and death rates might be changing from high to low but such 
changes will not be reflected in the growth of population unless the average 
difference between them is also changing. Furthermore, small changes in the 
difference between birth and death rates are also not reflected as the associated 
changes in the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016l). 
Birth and death rates might be decreasing but if they are decreasing in such a 
way that the average difference between them is approximately constant, the 
growth of population will be approximately exponential. If the difference increases 
systematically, then the growth of population will be described by a non-
exponential trajectory. For instance, if the difference increases, on average, 
hyperbolically, then the growth of population will be hyperbolic.  
To produce stagnation, the average difference between birth and death rates has 
to be approximately zero. To produce a stagnant but slowly increasing population, 
the average difference between birth and death rates would have to be changing in 
a very specific and complicated way. It would have to be on average zero over a 
long time but then it would have to be on average non-zero to generate growth. 
Then again it would have to revert back to zero to produce stagnation. This process 
would have to be repeated over a long time for thousands of years. We do not have 
data to demonstrate that such a process ever existed. We do not have data for birth 
and death rates extending over thousands of years. The claim that birth and death 
rates were high and that they were producing stagnation is unscientific because we 
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do not have data to prove it. However, we have a large body of data describing the 
growth of population and we can show that the growth of population was in general 
hyperbolic, which by inference means that the average difference between birth 
and death rates was increasing hyperbolically. There was no stagnation.  
To demonstrate a dramatic change from stagnation to growth in the growth of 
population we would have to demonstrate that there was a dramatic change in the 
average difference between birth and death rates from zero to a clearly and 
systematically larger value, and it does not matter whether birth and death rates 
were decreasing or increasing. What determines the growth of population is the 
average difference between birth and death rates. 
If we want to claim some kind of transitions in birth and death rates, there is 
nothing to stop us from doing it. However, we should remember that, in general, 
such studies will not help us to understand the mechanism of growth of population. 
They might be interesting and stimulating for another reason but unless we pay 
close attention to how the difference between these two quantities is changing, how 
large or how systematic are these changes, and how these changes can be 
explained, we shall not explain the mechanism of growth of human population. We 
also should remember that only significant changes in the difference between birth 
and death rates are reflected as changes in growth trajectories. 
The frequently used example in support of the concept of stagnation followed 
by explosion is the growth of population in Sweden between around AD 1750 and 
2000. It shows changes in the difference between birth and death rates but no-one 
seems to have noticed that these changes are relatively small. Furthermore, no-one 
seems to have noticed that these small changes are not reflected in the growth of 
population, even though data for the birth and death rates and for the growth of 
population come from exactly the same source (Statistics Sweden, 1999). These 
data are selectively and consistently ignored in order to preserve the perfect 
intonation of the mantra of Malthusian stagnation. 
Small changes in the average values of birth and death rates are repeatedly but 
incorrectly interpreted as a proof of the existence of the epoch of Malthusian 
stagnation and of a transition from stagnation to growth while data presented in the 
same primary source show clearly that the growth of population in Sweden was 
increasing monotonically without any signs of stagnation and without any sign of a 
transition from stagnation to growth. These issues were discussed earlier (Nielsen, 
2016l). 
Demographic research concentrating on the study of birth and death rates might 
be important but it is incorrect to think that such a research can be necessarily 
useful for explaining the mechanism of growth of human population. The two 
mechanisms are related only via the average difference between birth and death 
rates. There might be strong fluctuations in birth and death rates but these 
fluctuations are generally not reflected in the growth of population. They might be 
reflected only as minor variations in the growth trajectory describing the growth of 
population. 
In conformity with the established knowledge, Komlos claimed that 
‚Malthusian positive checks (mortality crises) maintained a long-run equilibrium 
between population size and the food supply‛ (Komlos, 1989, p. 194). Here we 
have a hinted link to the specific type of demographic catastrophes: famines. He 
also claimed that ‚the food-controlled homeostatic equilibrium had prevailed since 
time immemorial‛ (Komlos, 2000, p. 320). Komlos appears to have been guided by 
the generally accepted consensus. However, science never relies on any generally 
accepted consensus. It is not unusual in science to show that the generally accepted 
consensus is scientifically unacceptable.  
The postulate of Malthusian stagnation in the economic growth and in the 
growth of human population, as well as all other related postulates, are 
scientifically unacceptable. because they are systematically contradicted by data 
(Nielsen, 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2016h; von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Growth of population, global or regional, was 
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hyperbolic, (Nielsen, 2016d; 2016j; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Economic 
growth was also hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2016a).  
In the case of the growth of human population we can extend our study to 
10,000 BC. It is remarkable, that over the past 12,000 years the growth of 
population was not only hyperbolic but also exceptionally stable (Nielsen, 2016j) 
because over this long time there was only one major transition around AD 1 from 
a fast to a slow hyperbolic trajectory. There was also another but only minor 
transition around AD 1300 from a slower to a slightly faster hyperbolic growth. 
Currently we are experiencing a new transition to a yet unknown trajectory but the 
growth is still close to the historical hyperbolic trajectory. 
We can extend the analysis of the growth of population even further, over the 
past 2,000,000 years and show that the growth was hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2017). 
There is nothing in the data to support the claim that ‚Throughout human history, 
epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the growth path of population‛ 
(Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 435). 
We already know that Malthusian positive checks, which include demographic 
catastrophes, trigger the process of regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i). 
This process alone, explains the remarkable stability of the growth of human 
population. However, in order to understand even better why demographic 
catastrophes had generally no impact on the growth of population we shall now 
investigate their relative intensity and other parameters defining their possible 
impact. 
 
3. Preliminary remarks  
Impacts of demographic catastrophes depend on the death toll, their duration 
and on the size of population. Death toll for a given demographic event might be 
high but to understand its impact we have to express it as the relative impact by 
comparing the death toll with the size of population, which could be the size of 
local population directly affected by a demographic crisis or it could be the size of 
a regional or global population, depending on whether we are interested in the 
study of local, regional or global impacts.  
Impacts of demographic catastrophes depend also on the historical time. In the 
distant past, when the population was small, local impacts of demographic 
catastrophes could be large. However, people were living in greater isolation so the 
global or even regional impacts could have been small. Likewise, at the other end 
of the historical time scale, when the population increased to a certain large size, 
relative impacts were small even if the number of people killed by a given 
demographic catastrophe was large. It can be, therefore, expected that there is only 
a relatively small window of time, mainly during the AD era until around 1800, 
when the global population reached its first billion, or maybe until around 1900, 
that the demographic catastrophes could have had a noticeable impact on the 
growth of population. However, the study of human population shows that in 
general they had no damaging impact, with the exception of the already mentioned 
minor disturbance around AD 1300 (Nielsen, 2016j).   
The further we go back in time with our investigation the less we know about 
the intensity of demographic catastrophes but we have enough information for the 
AD era to assess their possible impacts. 
In order to understand human population dynamics, it is essential to identify the 
main and the most obvious driving force of growth and add to it any other force or 
forces only if the assumed main force cannot explain growth. The fundamental 
force of growth of human population is obviously the force of procreation 
expressed as the difference between the biologically-controlled force of sex drive 
and the biologically-controlled process of aging and dying. This force cannot be 
dismissed and it turns out that this force alone explains why the spontaneous and 
unconstrained growth of human population is hyperbolic and why for the most part 
of the past human history it was hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2016m).  
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In the past 12,000 years, other forces were playing a significant role only during 
the major demographic transition around AD 1 and during the minor transition 
around AD 1300. They are also strong and active during the current transition. 
With the exception of these rare events, the growth was hyperbolic in the past 
12,000 years. Furthermore, with the exception of the minor disturbance around AD 
1300, there is no evidence that demographic catastrophes were ever shaping the 
growth of human population (Nielsen, 2016d; 2016j).  
It should be also noted that the recorded impacts of demographic catastrophes 
are likely to be exaggerated. Recorded death rates ‚are largest when the supporting 
evidence is skimpiest. When data are better, the death rates are usually lower and 
the percentage increases less‛ (Watkins & Menken, 1985, p. 651). For instance, 
both Durand (1960) and Fitzgerald (1936; 1947) claim that impact of the An Lu-
Shan Rebellion (AD 756-763) is probably exaggerated. Likewise, Russel (1968) 
and Twigg (1984) believe that the number of casualties caused by the Justinian 
Plague (AD 541-542) is also grossly overestimated.  
Another example is the Antonine Plague (AD 166-270), which was first 
estimated to have killed about 50% of the population of the Roman Empire (Seeck, 
1921). However, this estimate was later downgraded to 1-2%, or to the total 
number of casualties of 500,000-1,000,000 (Gilliam, 1961) and then upgraded to 7-
10% or to a maximum of 5 million (Littman & Littman, 1973), the last estimate 
being still significantly smaller than the original estimate. It appears that the further 
back in time we go the larger is the possibility of exaggerated claims of the number 
of casualties.     
We shall describe demographic catastrophes in the way they are reported in the 
literature. However, labelling them with just a single cause might not be accurate. 
For instance, a war considered as the main cause of a crisis might include famine 
but famine might be linked with pestilence. For example, during the Madras famine 
in the 1870s, about 40% of casualties were caused by smallpox and cholera 
(Lardinois, 1985). The Justinian Plague was also accompanied by smallpox, 
diphtheria, cholera and influenza (Shrewsbury, 1970) and was ‚perhaps aided by 
wars, famines, floods and earthquakes‛ Scott & Duncan (2001, p. 5). Likewise, ‚a 
number of epidemics in France were preceded by famine, sometimes in 
conjunction with bad weather conditions‛ (Scott & Duncan, 2001, p. 105) whereas 
‚frequent and virulent outbreaks in France during 1520-1600 were accompanied by 
food shortages, famines, flooding, peasant uprisings and religious wars‛ (Scott & 
Duncan, 2001, p. 291). 
While drawing from primary sources about the frequency and intensity of 
demographic catastrophes, the presented here survey has been also assisted by 
some useful compilations (Austin Alchon, 2003; Kohn, 1995; Spignesi, 2002; 
White, 2011).  
 
4. Examples of prominent demographic catastrophes  
One of the earliest recorded devastating plagues was the Asiatic disease 
identified now as tularaemia, a bacterial disease caused by Francisella tularensis, 
first recorded around the early 1700s BC. It spread over a large area between 
Cyprus and Iraq and between Palestine and Syria. This disease appears to be also 
the first recorded example of the use of biological weapon when it was introduced 
deliberately to Anatolia (Trevisanato, 2004; 2007). The same disease has been also 
probably recorded in the Bible as causing a great number of deaths among 
Philistines in the city of Ashdod, the event dated either to around 1000 BC (Khan, 
2004) or to 1320 BC (Cunha & Cunha, 2006).  
Early recorded plagues include also a viral haemorrhagic fever in Egypt 
between 1500-1350 BC (Duncan & Scott, 2005) but it might have been the same 
disease as recorded earlier in Egypt and the same plague that decimated Philistines.  
Incidentally, Duncan & Scott (2005) claim that Black Death was not a bubonic 
plague caused by bacterium Yersinia pestis, as traditionally claimed, but rather that 
is was a viral haemorrhagic fever, which according to them includes also the 
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plagues of Mesopotamia (700-350 BC), the Plague of Athens (430-427 BC), the 
Plague of Justinian (AD 541-542), Plagues of Islam (AD 627-744), plagues in Asia 
minor (1345-1348), and the plague of Denmark and Sweden (1710-1711).  
The epidemic of Athens (460-399 BC) is claimed to have killed 25% of 
Athenian army and a great number of civilians (Austin Alchon, 2003). It created a 
turning point in the history of Greece (Ross, 2008). It is also claimed that this 
plague killed 50% of the army of Pericles and 50% of the navy coming to the 
rescue from Piraeus (Beran, 2008). The plague was triggered by the overcrowding 
of Athens when Spartan’s attacks prompted rural population to seek shelter in that 
city, which was already housing a relatively large number of people, an estimated 
300,000 citizens and around 3 million slaves.  
The earliest large demographic catastrophe in the AD era appears to have been 
associated with the Red Eyebrows Revolt, which commenced around AD 2. The 
estimated size of Chinese population at that time is claimed to have been 59.6 
million but it might have been reduced to 21 million in AD 57 (Durand, 1960). 
However, Durand also discusses possible inaccuracies in these estimates and 
presents corrected numbers of 74 million in AD 2 and 45 million in AD 88, for the 
entire Chinese Empire. He also estimates 71 million and 43 million, respectively, 
for the China proper (Durand, 1960, p. 221). By China proper he means the current 
18 provinces. He uses this estimate in his graph (Durand, 1960, p. 247). In both 
cases, the relative death toll is approximately 39% of the original population in 
China but only a maximum of 12% of the global population, too weak to produce 
any noticeable impact. 
The Red Eyebrows Revolt and the associated dramatic decrease in the size of 
population in China was in the middle of a massive demographic transition, one 
and only major demographic transition in the past 12,000, a transition from a fast to 
a slow hyperbolic trajectory, the transition which lasted for approximately 1000 
years. This transition is shown in Figure 2. The dramatic event in China had no 
impact on the growth trajectory of the world population.  
Durand points out also that estimates of the size of the population at the time of 
demographic catastrophes might be inaccurate. ‚Even if such huge loss were 
conceivable, it would be naïve to suppose that accurate count of the survivors could 
have been carried out in the midst of the ensuing chaos‛ (Durand, 1960, p. 224). 
White (2011) attributes only 10 million of casualties to the Red Eyebrows Revolt.  
However, to estimate the impact of this demographic catastrophe we shall use the 
revised estimate of Durand (1960) representing the total death toll of 29 million 
over 87 years.  
Similar uncertainty in the estimated death toll applies also to the An Lu-Shan 
Rebellion (AD 756-763). Acceptable records appear to show the death toll of 36 
million but White (2011) attributes only 13 million.  
 
Between A.D. 705 and 755 to all appearances the census machinery 
functioned much more effectively; but after 755 it broke down again. The 
recorded number of persons dropped from nearly 53 millions in the year 755 
to only 17 millions in 760. During this time, China was torn by revolts which 
were suppressed with bloody force, including the notorious rebellion of An 
Lu-Shan. Many historians have affirmed that 36 million lives were lost as a 
result of these violent events, but Fitzgerald and others have shown that this 
is incredible (Durand, 1960, p. 223; Fitzgerald, 1936, 1947).  
 
In order to maximise the possible impact of this demographic crisis, we shall 
assume that the death toll was 36 million.  
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Figure 2. Demographic transition in the growth of global population around AD 1. The 
transition can be described by the monotonically changing distribution (Nielsen, 2016j; 
2017). Rebellion of An Lu-Shan, which caused a massive reduction in the size of 
population in China, had no impact on the growth of global population. For the reference to 
the sources of data and for the description of their analysis see Nielsen (2016j; 2017). 
 
The impact of the Plague of Justinian is hard to estimate because of the 
incomplete information combined with conflicting claims. The plague is claimed to 
have reduced the population of Constantinople by 40% between AD 541 and 542 
(Austin Alchon, 2003). Cunha and Cunha (2006) estimated a 30% reduction of the 
population of the Roman Empire between AD 542 and 590, or a maximum of 
about 14 million out of the total of 48 million (Maddison, 2006; Seeck, 1921). 
‚The plague so weakened the Roman Empire that not long after the plague had 
passed, Roman borders were overrun by Huns, Goths, Moors, and other 
‘barbarians’‛ (Cunha & Cunha, 2006). Rosen (2007) estimates that this plague 
killed 25 million people in a short time of only between AD 541 and 542. In 
around AD 549 the same plague emerged also in Britain (Carmichael, 2009). It is 
also claimed that ‚The Plague of Justinian recurred in discernible cycles of about 
nine to twelve years‛ (Dols, 1974, p. 373).  
There is also one claim, which is distinctly different than all other estimates. 
Assisted by the Eurasian Silk Road, this plague was supposed to have spread to 
China in around AD 610, (Ross, 2008) continuing its devastation until around AD 
700 (Duncan & Scott, 2005) and killing probably a maximum of about 100 million 
people (Ross, 2008), which would represent a 50% reduction in the world 
population. Even if we consider the regenerating effects of Malthusian positive 
checks (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i), such a huge reduction should be reflected 
in the growth trajectory but it is not. By AD 500, the growth of the world 
population was at the end of its transition (see Figure 2) and commenced its new 
hyperbolic trend. In AD 500, the estimated size of the world population was only 
190 million (Nielsen, 2016j and references therein). The claimed massive death toll 
of 100 million was supposed to have occurred between AD 610 and 700, i.e. when 
the growth of the world population settled already along a new hyperbolic 
trajectory, but we see no sign of such a disturbance. This claim of such a large 
death toll is almost certainly incorrect. 
In our survey, in order to maximise the evidence in favour of the concept of 
Malthusian stagnation, we are considering the strongest impacts, which for the 
Plague of Justinian appears to be the death toll of 25 million in a very short time, 
between AD 541 and 542. We shall see later that, under this assumption, this 
plague had the strongest overall impact of all demographic catastrophes ever 
recorded, as manifested by four out of five indicators, and yet it caused no 
noticeable disturbance in the growth of the world population (see Figure 2). 
Black Death (1343-1351) is another example of a massive demographic 
catastrophe and is claimed to have killed over 60% of the urban population in Asia, 
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about 30% of the population of the Middle East and 30-60% of the population of 
Europe (Hawas, 2008). Beran (2008) claims that in many cities the death toll was 
over 90%, creating a severe hardship for the surviving population and adding to the 
total death toll caused also by the lack of food and lack of access to safe drinking 
water. The decaying corpses were also reducing the chance of survival. About 20% 
of the population of England died between AD 1348 and 1350 and a total of 50% 
by AD 1400 (Gilliam, 1961). Depending on the affected area, mortality rates varied 
between 25% and 70% (Cunha & Cunha, 2006). In terms of the total and relative 
death toll, Black Death was the greatest single demographic catastrophe ever 
recorded. 
As mentioned earlier, plagues were also used as biological weapons by 
employing a gruesome practice of catapulting infected corpses at the walls of 
fortifications or hurling them over the walls by using trebuchets. This ghastly 
method was used by Greeks, Romans and other attackers between 300 BC and AD 
1100, and by Tartars in AD 1346 against the residents of Genoa (Cunha & Cunha, 
2006; Khan, 2004). 
Other examples of large local casualties caused by demographic catastrophes 
include smallpox in Japan (AD 812-814), killing about half of the population of 
that country (Austin Alchon, 2003); the 1696 famine killing between 25% and 30% 
of the population of Finland (Jutikkala, 1955); the 1770 famine in Bengal, killing  
about 30% of the population (or a total of 10 million) and the 1376 famine in Italy, 
killing 60% of the population (Ghose 2002; Keys, et al., 1950; Walford, 1878). 
According to Mallory (1926), 18 provinces of China experienced 1015 draughts 
between AD 620 and 1619, or about one per year. However, they were unevenly 
distributed, illustrating that while the number of casualties and impacts of 
demographic catastrophes might be high in small and isolated regions, their effects 
could be much less severe when averaged over a larger number of population.  
There was a total of 443 draughts in the Northern Division, 352 in the Central 
Division and 220 in the Southern Division. However, even within the same 
division, the number of draughts varied significantly between various districts. For 
instance, in the Northern Division, Honan District experienced a total of 112 
draughts but Kansu Division only 4. In the Central Division, the largest number of 
draughts (113) was in the Chekiang District and the smallest (28) in the Anhwei 
District. In the Southern Division, the number of draughts varied between 4 and 59 
per district.  
The list of significant lethal events in China includes: 60-70% of troops killed 
during a single military engagement in AD 16; 70% of Mongolians killed by 
hunger in AD 46; 30-40% of troops killed in AD 162; about 70% of troops killed in 
a single military engagement and by famine and epidemic; close to 100% killed by 
locusts and famine in AD 312 in the northern and central China; over 30% killed in 
Shantung in AD 762; over 50% in Chekiang in AD 806; 30-40% in Hupeh, 
Kinagsu and Anhui in  AD 891; 90% in Hopei in  1331; 50% of troops between  
1351-1352; over 70% in Shansi in AD 135; 60-70% in Hupeh in   1354, and 100% 
in various towns and villages in Hunan in  1484 (Austin Alchon, 2003; McNeill, 
1976)  
It is claimed that in Mexico, 25-50% of the population died of smallpox (1520-
1521), 60-90% probably of typhus (1531-1532), and over 50% of either the 
bubonic plague or typhus between 1576 and 1581 (Austin Alchon, 2003; Motolinía 
aka Fray Toribio de Benavente o Motolinía, 1971; del Paso y Troncoso, 1940; 
Prem, 1992).  
The estimated death toll in the Andes between 1524 and 1591 includes 30-50% 
by smallpox (1524-1527), 25-30% by measles or bubonic plague (1531-1533), 15-
20% by influenza, measles and smallpox (1558-1559), and about 50% by 
influenza, measles, smallpox and typhus between 1585 and 1591 (Cook, 1981; 
Dobyns, 1963). Dobyns (1993) gives also many examples of large death tolls, 
sometimes as high as 98% but most often close to 80-90%, caused by diseases 
among Native American population.  
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So, it appears that humans always lived with the threats and with deadly effects 
of demographic catastrophes strong enough to reduce often substantially the size of 
local populations. We shall now investigate their potential impact on the growth of 
the world population.  
 
5. Indicators of impact 
In order to study the potential impacts of demographic catastrophes we have to 
introduce a few useful gauge indicators. Their definition is assisted by the diagram 
presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.Schematic diagram describing the composition of a demographic catastrophe. The 
leading parameters are: – the duration of demographic catastrophe; T – the recovery time; 
A – the death toll. 
 
Before the onset of a demographic catastrophe, the population increases along 
the trajectory ( )f t . It reaches the size 0S at the time 0t , which marks the beginning 
of the demographic catastrophe. The demographic crisis lasts for  number of 
years, between the time
0t  and 1t . Depending on the intensity of the demographic 
catastrophe and on the efficiency of the process of regeneration (Malthus, 1798; 
Nielsen, 2016i), the growth of the population during the demographic crisis may be 
diverted to a new trajectory ( )h t , which might be still increasing, remain constant 
or decreasing. At the end of crisis, the size of the population is 
rS , which might be 
larger than, equal to, or smaller than the original size
0S . 1S , is the size of the 
population, which would have been reached if the crisis did not occur 
When the crisis is over, the growth of population continues along a new 
trajectory ( )g t The quantity A is the death toll and T is the recovery time, i.e. the 
time required for the population to reach the size 
1S . 
Recovery time depends on the growth rate, R, during the time of crisis. Over a 
relatively small span of time associated with demographic catastrophes we can use 
linear approximations of the relevant trajectories. 
 
T
A
Sdt
tdg
S
R
rr
1)(1
  ,      (3)
       
which gives  
 
R
a
T  ,         (4) 
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where  
 
0S
A
S
A
a
r
         (5) 
 
is the relative impact, i.e. the number of people killed by the demographic 
catastrophe as compared with the size of the population at the onset of crisis. 
The growth rate R can be estimated by examining the population data around 
the time of crisis while the quantity a can be easily calculated using the reported 
number of people A killed by the crisis and the estimated size of the population at 
the beginning of crisis. Using these readily accessible quantities we can then 
calculate the recovery time T, which together with a (the relative number of people 
killed during demographic crisis) will help to gauge the intensity of the 
demographic catastrophe.   
Another way of calculating the recovery time T is to use the exponential rather 
than linear approximation for the function )(tg . Under this assumption and using 
the well-known expression for the exponential function [eqn (2)] we can easily 
show that 
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This is a general formula that does not have to be related to a demographic 
crisis. It is simply a formula for calculating the time needed for the exponential 
growth to increase from
rS to 1S , which happens to be precisely what we want to 
use to calculate the recovery time. For small a, the recovery time calculated using 
eqn (6) is virtually the same as by using the eqn (4). Thus, for instance, for 
20%a  , the recovery time calculated using eqn (6) is only 10% smaller than 
using eqn (4). For lower values of a, the discrepancy is even smaller. It increases to 
23% for 50%a  . As we shall soon see, in our survey of demographic 
catastrophes we shall be dealing with a values of up to only 20%. 
If we use the hyperbolic approximation, then referring to the eqn (1), the 
recovery time is given by 
 
( )r r
A
T
S A kS


.         (7) 
 
If we want to use an approximate expression incorporating the relative impact a, 
then using the eqn (1) and (5) we get 
 
2
(1 )
a
T
A a k


.          (8) 
 
So now rather than using just the parameter A (the total death toll) we have two 
additional gauge indicators, a and T, the parameters that give us additional 
information about the intensity of crisis.  
However, we can also introduce yet another useful gauge indicator, which 
compares the recovery time with the duration of the demographic catastrophe. We 
shall call it the intensity indicator (I) and we shall define it simply as 
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
T
I  .         (9) 
 
If the recovery time T is large when compared with the duration of crisis, then 
we are dealing with a potentially strong demographic catastrophe. The larger was 
the recovery time compared with the duration of crisis the stronger was the 
devastating impact of crisis.  
However, there is also another hidden information in this indicator. Using the 
diagram presented in Figure 3 and assuming that gradients of functions )(tf and )(tg
are approximately the same, we can see that 
 
01 SS
A
I

 .                   (10) 
 
If 1 0A S S  , then 1I  , which then indicates that population size continued to 
increase during crisis. If 1 0A S S  , then  1I  , which then indicates that the size of 
population remained approximately constant during crisis. If 1 0A S S  , then  1I  , 
which indicates that the size of population was decreasing during crisis.  
Thus, by looking at the I indicator we can tell not only whether the crisis was 
weak or strong but also whether the population was still increasing, remained 
constant or decreasing during the crisis. However, even if 1I   it does not mean 
that we a dealing with a potentially strong crisis, because depending on the 
duration of crisis the size of the population could still remain approximately 
constant. A potentially strong demographic crisis will be characterized by I>>1. A 
guide to the intensity indicator is presented in Table 1. 
Finally, we can also introduce two other indicators: the per annum relative 
impact ( ) and the per annum intensity indicator ( ). 


a
  ,                   (11) 


I
 .                   (12) 
 
The complete list of indicators used to evaluate the effects of demographic 
catastrophes is presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 1.A guide to the interpretation of the intensity indicator (I) 
1I   Weak crisis. Population continues to increase during crisis.  
1I   Moderate crisis. Population size remains approximately constant during crisis. 
1I   Moderate or potentially strong crisis depending on the value of I. Population 
size decreases during crisis. 
I>>1 Potentially strong crisis 
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Table 2.Indicators used to process information about demographic catastrophes 
Symbol/Definition Description Unit 
0t  
The onset of crisis year 
A Death toll 610  
  Duration of crisis year 
0/a A S  The fraction of the population killed by crisis % 
/a   Per annum fraction of population killed by crisis %/year 
T Recovery time year 
2t  The year of the full recovery year 
/I T   Intensity indicator  
/I   The per annum intensity indicator  1year  
Note: Demographic catastrophe may be considered potentially strong if indicators 
0/a A S , /a  , 
T, /I T  and /I  are large.  
 
6. Evaluation of impacts of demographic catastrophes   
The survey of demographic catastrophes and their impacts is presented in Table 
3. The summary of all impacts is shown in Table 4. In order to maximise evidence 
in favour of the postulate of Malthusian stagnation we have considered only the 
most significant demographic catastrophes characterised by the death toll of 1A   
million. Had we included smaller demographic catastrophes, the fraction of 
potentially strong catastrophes, which could have had noticeable impact on the 
growth of the world population, would have been significantly reduced.  
The remarkable feature of this survey is that, in general and as revealed by the 
values of the introduced gauge indicators, even large catastrophic events had much 
smaller impact on the growth of the world population than it might have been 
expected by looking just at the death toll or at their reported local impacts. Indeed, 
we only have a few events that might have had a tangible impact, and they are all 
clustered around the early years of the AD era when the estimates of the total 
number of casualties were probably grossly exaggerated (Durand, 1960; Fitzgerald, 
1936; 1947; Gilliam, 1961; Littman & Littman, 1973; Russel, 1968; Twigg, 1984, 
Watkins & Menken, 1985).  
 
Table 3. Survey of major demographic catastrophes AD 1-1900. The most significant 
values of gauge indicators are indicated by bold characters and moderately significant by 
italics. (Symbols are explained in Table 2.) 
Event 0t  2t  A    a    T  I    
Red Eyebrows Revolt 2 245 29.0 87 11.5 0.13 157.5 1.8 0.02 
Antonine Plague 166 214 5.0 15 2.2 0.15 34.1 2.3 0.15 
Plague of Justinian  541 756 25.0 2 12.5 6.23 214.2 107.1 53.54 
An Lu-Shan Rebellion 756 845 36.0 8 15.4 1.93 227.7 28.5 3.56 
N. Egypt Earthquake 1201 1206 1.5 1 0.5 0.46 4.8 4.8 4.80 
Mongolian Conquest 1260 1405 40.0 35 11.3 0.32 110.6 3.2 0.09 
Great European Famine 1315 1336 7.5 3 2.0 0.68 19.1 6.4 2.13 
Famine in China 1333 1369 9.0 15 2.4 0.16 21.8 1.5 0.10 
Black Death 1343 1530 75.0 9 19.7 2.19 178.7 19.9 2.21 
Fall of the Yuan Dynasty 1351 1385 7.5 18 1.9 0.11 17.4 1.0 0.05 
Sweating Sickness 1485 1556 3.0 67 0.6 0.01 4.6 0.1 0.00 
Mexico Smallpox Epidemic 1520 1527 4.0 2 0.8 0.42 6.0 3.0 1.50 
French Wars of Religion 1562 1602 3.0 37 0.6 0.02 3.7 0.1 0.00 
Russia’s Time of Trouble 1598 1619 5.0 16 0.9 0.06 5.6 0.3 0.02 
Fall of the Ming Dynasty 1618 1669 25.0 27 4.3 0.16 25.2 0.9 0.03 
Thirty Years War 1618 1655 7.0 31 1.2 0.04 7.0 0.2 0.01 
Deccan Famine in India 1630 1633 2.0 2 0.3 0.17 2.0 1.0 0.50 
Famine in France 1693 1696 2.0 2 0.3 0.15 1.5 0.8 0.38 
Bengal Famine 1769 1778 10.0 5 1.2 0.23 4.7 0.9 0.19 
Napoleonic Wars  1803 1816 4.0 13 0.4 0.03 1.4 0.1 0.01 
Famines in China 1810 1819 22.5 2 2.3 1.13 7.9 3.9 1.96 
Great Irish Famine 1845 1850 1.0 6 0.1 0.01 0.2 0.0 0.01 
Famine in China 1846 1849 11.3 1 1.0 0.96 2.8 2.8 2.83 
Taiping Rebellion 1850 1868 20.0 15 1.6 0.11 4.5 0.3 0.02 
Famine in India 1866 1866 1.0 1 0.1 0.08 0.2 0.2 0.20 
Famine in Rajputana 1869 1869 1.5 1 0.1 0.11 0.3 0.3 0.29 
Famine in Persia 1870 1871 2.0 2 0.1 0.07 0.4 0.2 0.10 
Famine in N. China  1876 1880 13.0 3 0.9 0.31 2.3 0.8 0.25 
British India Famine 1876 1903 17.0 25 1.1 0.05 2.6 0.1 0.00 
Yellow River Flood 1887 1887 2.0 1 0.1 0.13 0.3 0.3 0.31 
Famine in India 1896 1902 8.3 6 0.5 0.08 1.1 0.2 0.03 
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Table 4. Summary of impacts of demographic catastrophes.  
Indicator Impact Number of 
Events 
Fraction of Total 
[%] 
Insignificant 
[%] 
Relative impact (a) Strong 2 6  
 Moderate 3 10  
 Negligible 26 84 94 
Per annum relative impact ( ) Strong 1 3  
 Moderate 2 6  
 Negligible 28 91 97 
Recovery time (T) Strong 5 16  
 Moderate 5 16  
 Negligible 21 68 84 
Intensity indicator (I) Strong 1 3  
 Moderate 11 35  
 Negligible 19 62 97 
Per annum intensity indicator (  ) Strong 1 3  
 Moderate 7 23  
 Negligible 23 74 97 
The average of all five Strong 2.0 6.5  
 Moderate 5.6 18.1  
 Negligible 23.4 75.4 93.5 
Note: The attribute described as strong should be interpreted as potentially strong or the strongest of 
all impacts. This attribute does not identify impacts, which had a strong impact on the growth of 
population but only impacts, which were potentially strong enough to have a noticeable impact.  
 
The leading indicator is the relative impact a because it gives the direct 
information about how the growth trajectory might have been affected by a given 
individual demographic catastrophe. Events for which a is less than or equal to 
around 10% can be ignored, because such displacements would be hardly 
noticeable on the trajectories describing the growth of population. The 
corresponding demographic catastrophes could be described as negligible. Even 
events with a up to around 20% could be expected to have only relatively small 
effect. However, in this survey we have two events (An Lu-Shan Rebellion and 
Black Death), with the relative impact of 15.4% and 19.7%, which we shall 
describe as having a potentially strong impact. They account for only 6% of all 
impacts. Thus 94% of all large demographic catastrophes, i.e. catastrophes with 
1A   million, were individually too weak to have a significant impact on the 
growth of the world population. 
We should remember, however, that we are ignoring the spontaneous process of 
regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i). By describing a crisis as strong we 
are only distinguishing it from other catastrophes. A strong crisis is only relatively 
strong or potentially strong. It is a crisis, which could have been reflected in the 
growth of population but considering the ever-present mechanism of regeneration 
its impact is likely to be significantly reduced.  
If we consider the per annum impact measured by the indicator  , we can see 
that there was possibly only one event (Plague of Justinian) that might have had a 
relatively strong impact on the growth of the population and two (An Lu-Shan 
Rebellion and Black Death) that might have had a marginal impact. Thus, when 
measured by this indicator, 97% of all large demographic catastrophes had 
insignificant effect on the growth of the world population.  
The recovery time (T) shows five significant events (Red Eyebrow Revolt, 
Plague of Justinian, An Lu-Shan Rebellion, Mongolian Conquest and Black 
Death). For all of them, the estimated recovery time was between around 100 and 
200 years. They represent 16% of all demographic catastrophes, the largest fraction 
in this survey. However, even for this indicator, the fraction of negligible events is 
high, 84%. The majority of all large critical events could have potentially inflicted 
only negligible impact on the growth of population.  
The intensity indicator (I) suggests only one prominent event (Plague of 
Justinian) and possibly 11 moderately strong events. This indicator, therefore, 
shows that 97% of all large demographic catastrophes could have had, at best, only 
small impact on the growth of the world population. For the per annum intensity 
indicator (  ), the fraction of insignificant impacts is the same, 97%. 
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If we consider the average values of all five indicators we can see that only 
6.5% of all demographic catastrophes with the death toll larger or equal to 1 
million might have had a tangible impact on the growth of the world population. 
The remaining 93.5% were too weak to have any significant impact. It is, therefore, 
clear that demographic catastrophes were too weak to shape the trajectory of 
growth of the world population, particularly if we consider that demographic 
catastrophes trigger also a strong process of regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 
2016i).  
The generally large percentage of insignificant impacts is an overwhelming 
evidence contradicting the concept of Malthusian stagnation but confirming 
conclusions based on the analysis of distributions describing the growth of 
population and the economic growth (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d; 2016j), the analysis 
showing the absence of convincing evidence of frequent impacts of demographic 
catastrophes.  
It is also useful to notice certain correlations between gauge indicators because 
such correlations could give a closer insight into the process of demographic 
catastrophes. They can reveal what was happening during a given crisis. Thus, for 
instance, the intensity indicator (I) for the Mongolian Conquest shows that 
population was decreasing during this crisis but the per annum intensity indicator 
shows that the population was approximately constant. The intensity indicator was 
also not excessively large. The size of the population was decreasing but slowly. 
However, the recovery time was exceptionally high. We can explain it by noticing 
that the duration of the crisis was long.  
Our survey shows also a unique convergence of five demographic catastrophes. 
They were: the Mongolian Conquest (1260-1295) with the total estimated death 
toll of 40 million; Great European Famine (1315-1318), 7.5 million; the 15-year 
Famine in China (1333-1348), 9 million; Black Death (1343-1352), 75 million; and 
the Fall of Yuan Dynasty (1351-1369), 7.5 million. Their combined maximum 
death toll was 139 million. The estimated size of the world population in AD 1250 
was around 380 million. The combined maximum relative impact of this five 
catastrophes was, therefore, around 37%. Such a strong impact should be reflected 
in the growth of the world population and indeed it was but not as strongly as we 
could have expected (Nielsen, 2016j). It caused only a minor disturbance. During 
this crisis, the population was decreasing but very slowly to reach 360 million at 
the termination of these five catastrophes, illustrating the efficient process of 
regeneration even during this combined crisis. This crisis was followed by a faster 
growth and the lost time was soon recovered, the faster growth illustrating again 
the efficient process of spontaneous regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i). 
Before the crisis, the growth of population was following hyperbolic trajectory 
characterised by 33.448 10k   . If continued undisturbed, it would have reached 
the size 
1 470S  million in around AD 1400. However, the actual size, rS , at that 
time was 360 million. If the growth of population after the crisis continued along 
the same hyperbolic trajectory as before the crisis, then the recovery time, 
calculated using the eqn (7), would have been 224 years. However, after the crisis, 
the growth of population was following a faster trajectory, characterised by
34.478 10k   . So, if we use the eqn (7) again we can calculate that the 
corresponding recovery time for this faster trajectory was 173 years. The actual 
recovery time, as recorded by data, was around 165 years, which is in good 
agreement with the calculated value. The process of regenerations decreased the 
recovery time by 50-60 years.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions   
The study presented here adds to the explanation why demographic catastrophes 
did not shape the growth of population and the associated economic growth. 
The currently accepted interpretation of the historical growth of population is 
succinctly summarised in the following statement: ‚Throughout human history, 
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epidemics, wars and famines have shaped the growth path of population‛ 
(Lagerlöf, 2003a, p. 435). If such is the case we should have no problem with 
showing many examples of this mechanism but we cannot find them. We can 
analyse data going as far back as 2,000,000 years ago and we can see that with the 
exception of just one minor disturbance around AD 1300 there is no evidence of 
such effects (Nielsen, 2016j; 2017). We also see no evidence in the distributions 
describing regional growth of population (Nielsen, 2016d).  
This imagined, but never proven mechanism, was supposed to have been 
responsible for creating an endless epoch of Malthusian stagnation characterised by 
irregular and generally stagnant state of growth of population and of economic 
growth, but data are in clear contradiction of this doctrine (Nielsen, 2016a; 2016d; 
2016j; 2017; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). It is a doctrine, which is based 
on the incorrect interpretation of hyperbolic growth. 
The growth of population and economic growth were hyperbolic. It is a 
monotonically increasing growth. It is slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time but there is no stagnation and no takeoff or explosion at any time. Stagnation 
and explosion are just illusions, which readily disappear when we use the method 
of reciprocal values (Nielsen, 2014) to analyse data. What we see as a stagnation is 
just a monotonically increasing growth and what we see as an explosion is just the 
natural continuation of hyperbolic growth. 
We have demonstrated that with the exception of just one event in the past 
12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016j), and indeed in the past 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 
2017), there is no evidence that demographic catastrophes were ever shaping the 
growth of the world population. This unique event occurred around AD 1300 and 
coincides with five strong demographic catastrophes: the Mongolian Conquest 
(1260-1295) with the total estimated death toll of 40 million; Great European 
Famine (1315-1318), 7.5 million; the 15-year Famine in China (1333-1348), 9 
million; Black Death (1343-1352), 75 million; and the Fall of Yuan Dynasty 
(1351-1369), 7.5 million. The combined death toll caused by them is estimated at a 
maximum of 139 million. At the onset of this unique event the world population 
was only about 380 million, so the relative impact should have been strong. This 
combined crisis lasted for about 280 years but it caused only a minor disturbance in 
the growth of population. At the end of this crisis, the size of population was 
reduced to only 360 million. There is also no convincing evidence that 
demographic catastrophes were shaping the growth of regional populations 
(Nielsen, 2016d). Likewise, there is no convincing evidence that they had any 
tangible impact on the economic growth, global or regional (Nielsen, 2016a).  
We have already explained why demographic catastrophes did not shape the 
growth of population. We have demonstrated (Nielsen, 2016i) that, as first 
observed by Malthus (1798), his so-called positive checks (demographic 
catastrophes and many forms of harsh living conditions) are responsible not only 
for increasing the death toll but also for triggering the process of regeneration, 
reflecting the well-known phenomenon observed commonly in nature. Thus, the 
destructive action of even strong demographic catastrophes is quickly compensated 
by this process, which is likely to produce even faster growth than before.  
We can now understand why a combination of five strong demographic 
catastrophes were needed to cause only minor and relatively short-lasting 
disturbance in the growth of population around AD 1300. This was one and only 
example in the past 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 2017) when we can see a correlation 
between the growth of population and demographic catastrophes. Now we have 
added to this explanation by showing that individually, demographic catastrophes 
were generally too weak to have a tangible impact on the growth of population. On 
rare occasions, when they were strong enough to cause some minor damage, their 
action was quickly counteracted by the spontaneous and efficient process of 
regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i). 
We have defined a series of gauge indicators allowing for a study of impacts of 
demographic catastrophes. We have also concentrated our attention on the 
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strongest catastrophes, thus maximising the fraction of potentially destructive 
impacts. Even then, this fraction turned out to be small. On average, only 6.5% of 
all major demographic catastrophes could have had a certain impact but as 
demonstrated by the analysis of relevant data (Nielsen, 2016d; 2016j; 2017) they 
had no impact. They were only relatively strong but even if they were stronger, 
such isolated actions could have been hardly expected to cause lasting disturbances 
in the growth trajectory, particularly if we consider the apparently ever-present 
process of regeneration (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016i).  
Any negative impact on the growth of population could be expected to be 
reflected also in the economic growth but the analysis of data shows that the 
economic growth remained also undisturbed (Nielsen, 2016a). The growth of 
population and economic growth were exceptionally stable and generally 
uninterrupted. Demographic catastrophes did not shape the economic growth or the 
growth of population.  
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